Part Three ***Norms, Self-Consciousness, and Recognition***

Lecture 10

**The Fine Structure of Autonomy and Recognition:**

**The Institution of Normative Statuses by Normative Attitudes**

1. Introduction
2. Normative Statuses and Normative Attitudes: A Regimented Idiom

The aim of this lecture is to develop a regimented idiom to explore the normative pragmatics (the theory of what corresponds to Fregean “force”) that the investigation of semantics (the theory of what corresponds to Fregean “content”) in the *Consciousness* chapters has led us to, and then, in the next lecture, to use it to read the various allegories of Mastery that Hegel recounts in *Self-Consciousness*. In keeping with the discussion of the previous lecture [Chapter 9], its base is the distinction between normative statuses and normative attitudes. In the idiom of the regimentation, this distinction corresponds to Hegel’s distinction between *what consciousness is* ***in itself*** and *what consciousness is* ***for consciousness***. Where in the *Consciousness* chapters we were concerned with conceptions of the *objects* of consciousness, and so the distinction *to* consciousness between what things are *in themselves* and what things are *for consciousness*, our topic here becomes the *subject* of consciousness, consciousness itself. And here, too, the distinction that consciousness essentially involves is a distinction not only for us (Hegel’s readers, the phenomenological consciousness) but also *to* consciousness itself.[[1]](#footnote-1) It is this distinction between what *consciousness* is *in itself* and what it is *for consciousness* that I will model in terms of the regimented distinction between normative *statuses* and normative *attitudes*.

Hegel also distinguishes, within the domain of what consciousness is for consciousness, between what a consciousness is for *another* consciousness and what a consciousness is for *itself*. So for instance, what the Master is for the Servant (a different consciousness) can at various points in Hegel’s story be distinguished from what the Master is for himself, and *vice versa*. This distinction is rendered in the present model by distinguishing two sorts of normative attitudes, in terms of the different social perspectives they embody: *attributing* a normative status (to another) and *acknowledging* or claiming a normative status (oneself). This additional distinction within the category of normative attitudes is matched in the model by a distinction within the category of normative statuses. This is the distinction between *authority* and *responsibility*. It corresponds, according to the interpretation being presented here, to Hegel’s use of the terms “independence” and “dependence” (“Unabhängigkeit”/“Abhängigkeit”) when they are applied to the *subjects* of consciousness rather than the *objects* of consciousness.

The structure envisaged is accordingly the following:



So, in the regimented idiom of the model, the paradigmatic normative statuses are identified as responsibility and authority, or commitment and entitlement. The attitudes in question include attributing these statuses to another, and acknowledging or claiming them oneself.

I am claiming that the vocabulary of this regimentation is not far from that Hegel himself uses, however. Although his usage is broader, I understand Hegel’s distinction between what things are *in themselves* and what they are *for consciousness*, when applied to the domain of normativity that is first addressed in the *Self-Consciousness* chapter, just to be the distinction between normative *statuses* and normative *attitudes*. And though again his terms have uses outside the realm of normativity, I understand Hegel’s distinction between *independence* and *dependence*, when applied to the normative realm, to be essentially that between the normative statuses of *authority* and *responsibility*.

Though the concern of the *Self-Consciousness* chapter is ultimately with the *subjects* of normative attitudes and statuses, those attitudes and statuses also have *objects*. On the side of attitudes, what is attributed or acknowledged is just statuses of authority and responsibility. One normative subject, X, can attribute authority or responsibility to another, Y. X is then the *subject* of the attitude, the normative status attributed is the *object* of the attitude, and the subject *to* whom the status is attributed is the *indirect* *object* or *target* of the attribution. So, for instance, in Hegel’s terminology one consciousness can be independent or dependent not only *in itself*, but also *for* *itself* or *for another consciousness*. In the case of acknowledgments, the subject and the target are the same—not just *de facto*, but *de jure*, as part of what it means for the attitude in question to be *acknowledgment*. Acknowledgments are to be distinguished from self-attributions, in just the way that essentially indexical uses of first-person pronouns express, by contrast to forms of contingent self-reference.[[2]](#footnote-2) So attitudes of acknowledging practical commitments can, in the central case, *be* intentional doings.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Normative statuses of authority and responsibility also have both subjects and objects. The subject of the status is the normative subject who is authoritative or responsible. The objects are what they have authority over or responsibility for. The topic of the *Reason* chapter is the central case where it is intentional doings that one has authority or responsibility to perform. Our concern here is rather with the equally fundamental case where what one has the authority or responsibility to do (what one is entitled or committed to do) is adopt normative attitudes of attributing or acknowledging further normative statuses. The fact that the objects of normative attitudes can be normative statuses, and the objects of normative statuses can be normative attitudes means that complex constellations of basic attitudes and statuses are possible. It is in these terms that I will suggest we ought to understand both the Kantian individualistic *autonomy* model of the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes and the Hegelian social *recognition* model of the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes, and the way in which the latter develops elaborates and develops the former (the sort of Aufhebung it is).

1. The Kantian Autonomy Model of the Institution of Normative Statuses by Normative Attitudes

If we start with two basic normative statuses, normative independence and dependence as authority and responsibility, and two basic normative attitudes, attributing responsibility or authority to another and acknowledging or claiming responsibility or authority for oneself, and think about them in the context of the idea that normative statuses might be not just dependent on normative attitudes but instituted by them, then an important compound of statuses and attitudes becomes visible. Kant’ construal of normativity in terms of autonomy is at base the idea that rational beings can *make* themselves responsible (institute a normative status) by *taking* themselves to be responsible (adopting an attitude). His idea (developing Rousseau’s) is that so long as the attribution of responsibility is self-consciously self-directed, that is, so long as it takes the form of *acknowledgment* of oneself *as* responsible, it is *constitutive*, in the sense that adopting that attitude is sufficient, all by itself, to institute the status.

What is it for an attitude of claiming or acknowledging responsibility to be *constitutive* of the status of responsibility it claims or acknowledges—that it *immediately* (that is, all by itself, apart from any other attitudes) *institutes* that status? As the object of an attitude, as what is acknowledged or attributed, a normative status such as responsibility or authority has a kind of virtual existence. There need not in general be an actual status corresponding to the attitude. One subject might wrongly attribute a responsibility to another, or claim an authority she herself does not in fact possess.

Kant’s conception of normative subjects as autonomous, as I am reading it, is a conception of them as able to *bind* themselves normatively by their attitudes, to *make* themselves responsible (acquire an actual normative status) by *taking* themselves to be responsible (adopting a normative attitude). In the favored cases, adopting the attitude actualizes the virtual status that is the object of the attitude. The resulting status is not just attitude-dependent (no attitude 🡪 no status) but immediately instituted by the attitudes (attitude 🡪 status). That is what it is to understand the attitude as *constitutive.*

Further, being able to adopt such immediately constitutive self\*-attributions is itself a normative status. For Kant thinks that rational knowers-and-agents have the *authority* to adopt immediately constitutive self\*-attributions or acknowledgments. To be a discursive being is to have the authority to commit oneself, epistemically in judgment and practically in intention (“adopting a practical maxim”). Both of these are undertakings or acknowledgings of responsibility: committing oneself to how things are or how they shall be. This *authority* to *make* oneself responsible just by *taking* oneself\* to be responsible might be called the *basic Kantian normative status* (BKNS, for short). Being a normative subject, for him, is being an autonomous agent-and-knower: one that can be the subject of normative statuses such as responsibility and authority. Furthermore, one is in the end committed to (responsible for) only what one explicitly *acknowledges* as one’s commitments (responsibilities)—and for commitment that turn out to be implicit in those acknowledgements as consequences or presuppositions of them. It is that authority to make oneself responsible that, according to Kant, other rational beings are obliged to recognize, as the fundamental dignity of rational knowers-and-agents.

The basic Kantian normative status is a complex, attitude-involving status. For it is the authority (the complex status) to adopt a certain kind of attitude: an immediately status-instituting attitude, what I am calling an “immediately constitutive” attitude. This sort of attitude is an attributing of a status (in the case of the BKNS, exclusively to oneself\*) such that adoption of that attitude is sufficient all by itself for the status to be exhibited by the one to whom it is attributed (in the case of the BKNS, so long as that is also the one by whom it is attributed). In Hegel’s terminology, it is a way consciousness can be *for* a consciousness that is sufficient to determine that that is the way consciousness is *in* itself. For one’s consciousness to be *that* way *for* one’s own consciousness *is* to be that way *in* oneself.



The bulk of the *Self-Consciousness* chapter consists of an investigation of the conception of this kind of immediately status-constituting attitude. For the idea of individual attitudes of attributing statuses that suffice, all by themselves, just in virtue of the kind of attitudes they are, to institute the statuses they attribute, is the idea of Mastery, or pure independence. (What it is purified of is all hint of dependence, that is, responsibility correlative with that authority.) And that is the topic of all the allegories of kinds of self-consciousness recounted in *Self-Consciousness.*

The concept of immediately status-constitutive attitudes is an extreme version of what I have claimed Hegel thinks of as the basic idea of modernity. On this rendering of the transition from traditional to modern, traditional forms of life revolved around an appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes, what we can now recharacterize as the *authority* of norms over attitudes, of how what obligations and authorities there are determine what responsibilities and authority normative subjects should acknowledge and attribute. By contrast, modern forms of life are characterized by an appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses, what we can now recharacterize as the *authority* of attitudes over norms, the way in which what obligations and authorities there are, and what they are, answers to the attributions and acknowledgments of normative subjects. The idea that some attitudes can *immediately institute* the normative statuses that are their objects, that in their case, *taking* someone to be authoritative or responsible can by itself *make* them have that authority or responsibility, is, on Hegel’s view a characteristic deformation of the modern insight into the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. It is the idea allegorized as Mastery. Hegel sees modernity as shot through with this conception of the relations between normative attitudes and normative statuses, and it is precisely this aspect of modernity that he thinks eventually needs to be overcome. In the end, he thinks even Kant’s symmetric, reflexive, self\*-directed version of the idea in the form of the autonomy model of normativity is a form of Mastery. In Hegel’s rationally reconstructed recollection of the tradition, which identifies and highlights an expressively progressive trajectory through it, Kant’s is the final, most enlightened modern form, the one that shows the way forward—but it is nonetheless a form of the structural *mis*understanding of normativity in terms of Mastery.

So the claim that normative attitudes *institute* normative statuses goes beyond the mere claim of attitude-*dependence* of normative statuses. But beyond these two is the claim that at least some normative attitudes are *immediately constitutive* of normative statuses. This sort of *taking* someone to be committed is sufficient for *making* that one *be* committed. Self-consciousness that understands itself in terms of the categories of Mastery construes normativity in terms of *immediately* status-constitutive attitudes. Hegel clearly thinks that such a conception takes the insight of modernity concerning the attitude-dependence of normative statuses too far. As we shall see, the form of his objection to all forms of self-conceptions that have the characteristic shape of Mastery—and that is essentially all the forms of self-consciousness discussed in the rest of the book, not just in the chapter on *Self-Consciousness*—is the same. We can think of Hegel’s diagnosis of the metaphysical error that manifests itself as forms of self-consciousness understanding itself in the way characteristic of Mastery as having three levels, proceeding from the more to the less abstract.

First, it is characteristic of self-consciousness with the structure of Mastery to understand itself as being, in itself, “pure independence.”[[4]](#footnote-4) That is, it conceives itself as exercising authority unmixed and unmediated by any correlative responsibility, which is normative “dependence.” This, Hegel claims, is an ultimately incoherent conception. It is something the Master can be at most *for* himself, not *in* himself. As so conceived, the Master would be unable to *commit* himself, for a determinately contentful commitment involves being responsible to the *content* to which one has committed oneself, in the sense that one makes oneself liable to assessment of one’s success in fulfilling that commitment (a judgment’s being true or an intention successful) to the normative standard set by the content of one’s status. The Master cannot acknowledge that moment of dependence-as-responsibility.

Second, as “pure independence,” the Master cannot acknowledge the responsibility of his attitudes to normative statuses: the status-dependence of normative attitudes that was, Hegel thinks, a genuine insight of traditional forms of normativity (Geist), albeit one that was expressed in deformed, because one-sided, practical conceptions of normativity in terms of the model of subordination and obedience. The question of whether the normative status the Master acknowledges or claims—what he is *for* himself\*—is what he *really* is, *in* himself, cannot arise within the conception of Mastery. For to acknowledge facts about what someone is *really* committed or entitled to, what responsibility or authority they *really* have, what they are *in* themselves, is to acknowledge something that serves as normative standards for the evaluation of the correctness of normative attitudes of attributing, acknowledging, or claiming those statuses. By contrast, the Master must understand his attitudes as answering to (responsible to, dependent on) *nothing*.

Finally, as already indicated, the Master has a conception of normative *force*, in Frege’s sense of the pragmatic significance of statuses and attitudes—what one is *doing* in becoming authoritative or responsible, and in attributing and exercising authority or attributing and acknowledging responsibility—that leaves no room for the contrast and division of labor between such force and the determinate conceptual *content* of either normative states or attitudes. This, I will claim, is the form of complaint that binds together the treatment of all the forms of self-consciousness conceiving itself according to categories of Mastery. There is no intelligible semantics (account of content) that is compatible with the pragmatics (account of normative force, status, and attitude) to which they are committed. A key to this line of thought is that Hegel understands the relations between Fregean force and content, between statuses and attitudes, on the one hand, and content on the other, in normative terms of authority and responsibility (independence and dependence). Developing a lesson he learned from Kant, Hegel takes the notion of content itself to be something that must be understood in terms of the way in which to understand statuses and attitudes as contentful is to understand them as responsible to, and so normatively dependent on, something determined by that content.

1. A Model of General Recognition

Hegel thinks that there is something deeply defective about the idea of normative attitudes that are *immediately constitutive* of normative statuses, which lies at the core of the Kantian understanding of normativity in terms of individual autonomy. Though there is also something deeply right about the Kant-Rousseau development of the self-government tradition in the modern metaphysics of normativity, the insight it affords about normative statuses as not only attitude-dependent, but as instituted by attitudes must be reconciled with the insight that normative statuses are at base *social* statuses. Hegel’s recognition model of the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes articulates the idea that other-regarding attitudes of attributing responsibility and authority (holding other normative subjects responsible, taking them to be authoritative) are equally essential to them really being responsible or authoritative (having the statuses of being committed or entitled) as are self-regarding attitudes of acknowledging those statuses.

The social dimension provided by normative attitudes of attribution is not simply absent from Kant’s picture, however. It is true that having the authority to make oneself responsible (institute that kind of normative status) by adopting a purely self-regarding attitude of acknowledging the responsibility (committing oneself) owes nothing to its attribution by others. It is a status that is constitutive of being an autonomous discursive being, a subject of normative attitudes and statuses. And that basic constitutive normative status is not itself instituted by normative attitudes. In this respect, Kant acknowledges not only the attitude-dependence of ground-level responsibilities, but also the dependence of the status-instituting capacity of those attitudes on the normative status that is the authority to institute responsibilities by acknowledging them: the authority to commit oneself. But that status as an autonomous normative subject, the subject of commitments just insofar as one is able (has the authority) to commit oneself, to bind oneself by norms that are binding just insofar as the one bound acknowledges them *as* binding, is a constitutive kind of *dignity*. As such, it unconditionally deserves the *respect* of other autonomous normative subjects. They have a *duty*—an obligation, a responsibility—to respect the dignity that consists in the authority to make onself responsible by taking oneself to be responsible. So Kant’s picture does have a social dimension, in which attribution as well as acknowledgment plays a role. We could diagram it like this:



This is complex interpersonal constellation of basic normative attitudes and normative statuses, in which relations of statuses as objects of attitudes and attitudes as objects of statuses are piled on one another five levels deep. As rational beings we have a standing formal obligation or responsibility (status—level 5) to respect, in the sense of attributing (attitude—level 4) to each rational being *as* a rational being, the dignity, in the sense of having the *authority* (a status—level 3) (which we *attribute* at level 4) constitutively to acknowledge (status-instituting attitude—level 2) responsibilities or commitments (status—level 1), both doxastic and practical.

All of these elements Hegel can applaud, and they are the basis for him to say that Kant was *almost* right. He had all the crucial conceptual elements, just not arranged properly.

So Kant has the idea that it is a necessary condition of *being* responsible that one *acknowledges* that responsibility. (That is autonomy.) And he does leave room for a distinction between *explicitly* acknowledging the responsibility, and acknowledging it only *implicitly*—for instance, just by being a knower and agent, thinking, talking and acting intentionally. But one might think—I think Hegel does think—that this is not yet a full-blooded sense of *being responsible*. It might well be laid alongside of another important but not yet full-blooded sense of *being responsible* that consists in being *held* responsible—a matter of *attributing*, rather than *acknowledging*.[[5]](#footnote-5) Hegel claims that genuine responsibility requires *both* of these attitudes, arranged as reciprocal recognition (dual attitudes of acknowledging and attributing) of the status. His view is what one gets by accepting this Kantian picture, but treating *both* attitudes, the attribution of authority as well as its exercise in acknowledging responsibility, as necessary, and jointly sufficient, for the institution of normative statuses.

Looking at the diagram of the complex constellation of basic attitudes and statuses that make up the Basic Kantian Normative Status makes clear that although the determinate responsibilities at the bottom of the diagram (cognitive commitments to claims and practical commitments to doings) are instituted by immediately constitutive attitudes, the authority to do that, which is autonomy, is not conceived as itself instituted by attitudes. And looking at the diagram of the social extension of the BKNS likewise makes clear that the duty to respect the autonomy of others is also a status that it is not itself instituted by attitudes. Being autonomous and having the responsibility to respect autonomy by attributing the authority to commit oneself are both statuses that are not instituted by attitudes but are for Kant constitutive of the status of being a rational, discursive being. That is why for him a special story needs to be told about how they are two sides of one coin, two necessarily intertwined aspects of one conception of such beings.

Suppose one accepted the motivations that lead Kant to the conception of the complex of basic attitudes and statuses that is the socially extended BKNS, but thought both that *all* normative statuses are instituted by normative attitudes, and that such institution requires not only the attitude of the subject of the status but also the attitude of some other who attributes it. This latter is the idea that the attitudes of any one individual normative subject can institute normative statuses only when they are *suitably complemented* by the attitudes of others. According to this line of thought, the respect others owe to autonomous normative subjects is not something *added to* the authority those subjects have, as autonomous, to institute responsibilities by acknowledging them (to make themselves responsible by taking themselves to be responsible). Recognition, the recognitive attitude of attributing the authority distinctive of autonomy, is an essential component required to institute that very authority. These are the thoughts that lead from the Kantian model of *individual* autonomous normative subjects as *immediately* instituting their determinate responsibilities by their attitudes of acknowledging them to the Hegelian model of the *social* institution of normative statuses by attitudes of normative subjects that must be *mediated* by each other’s suitably complementary attitudes.

What results from modifying the socially extended complex of basic attitudes and statuses that comprises both autonomy and the duty to respect it is a complex of attitudes and statuses that has a different, symmetrical, essentially social structure. At the crudest level, the structure is this:



This is a very basic constellation of normative attitudes and statuses. I am understanding Hegel as taking *this* to be the underlying metaphysical structure of (genuine) normativity.

All that is shown here of the complex constellation of attitudes and statuses exhibited by the two normative subjects is what corresponds to the top two-thirds of the BKNS. It does not represent the specific responsibilities and other statuses that each is recognized as having the authority to acknowledge. What is represented is a structure of general recognition, not specific recognition. It represents recognition in the sense of recognizing as, taking to be, a general recognizer. It is what in my first lecture [Chapter Eight] was called “robust recognition.” This is attributing the authority to adopt attitudes that are constitutive of statuses, not immediately, but in the sense that they institute statuses *if suitably socially complemented*. In order to institute the authority to institute statuses by one’s attitudes (here, attributions), one must oneself be taken to have (be recognized as having) that authority by another, whom one in turn recognizes as having that very same authority. The idea is that recognitive attitudes can institute recognitive authority just in case those attitudes are “suitably (socially) complemented” in the sense of being reciprocated. Recognitive authority—the authority that corresponds to autonomy in the BKNS, the authority to institute statuses by one’s attitudes—is itself instituted by suitably complemented recognitive attitudes. It is only when those attitudes are suitably complemented that they have the *authority* to institute normative statuses. *Hegelian recognition* is what *Kantian respect* (for the authority to institute statuses by one’s attitudes) becomes when that *attribution* of authority by another is understood as essential to the institution of the authority to institute statuses by one’s attitudes.

As autonomous, Kantian normative subjects can, in a certain sense, lift themselves up by their own bootstraps. For they can actualize normative statuses that are merely virtual, that is, that exist only as the objects of their normative attitudes. But the authority to do that, that authority in which their autonomy consists, is not itself the product of their own attitudes, nor of the attitudes of other normative subjects who are obliged to respect their autonomy by attributing that authority. Their possession of that authority is just a fact about them, as is everyone else’s responsibility to respect it. By contrast, the recognitive authority of Hegelian normative subjects is instituted entirely by recognitive attitudes that correspond to Kantian respect for the autonomy of others. The recognitive status that is virtual as the mere object of recognitive attitudes (attributions of authority) is actualized, according to the recognitive model, when and only when the recognizing subject is recognized (as a recognizing subject) by another recognizing subject whom the first subject recognizes in turn. They do not individually lift themselves up into the normative status of having recognitive authority by the bootstraps of their own recognitive attitudes (attributions of authority), but the recognitive unit they form when their recognition is mutual *does* lift the attitudes of *both*; it does promote their statuses (recognitive authority) that are merely virtual as the objects of their attitudes up to the level of actual normative statuses. The recognitive statuses are not immediately instituted by recognitive attitudes, but they are instituted by suitably socially complemented recognitive attitudes.

1. Model of Specific Recognition

This, I claim, is the basic constellation of attitudes and statuses (we’ll look further at its fine structure below) that Hegel invokes under the rubric of “the process of the pure Notion [Begriff] of recognition, of the duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness.”[[6]](#footnote-6) He introduces the topic by saying

Self-consciousness exists *in* and *for* *itself*, because and by virtue of its existing in and for itself for an other; which is to say, it exists only as recognized.[[7]](#footnote-7)

What a normative subject is *in itself* is its normative statuses. What it is *for itself* is its normative attitudes. Being a subject of normative statuses and attitudes depends on being recognized as such by another normative subject. “A self-consciousness exists *for a self-consciousness.* Only so is it in fact self-consciousness.”[[8]](#footnote-8) This is the step that sees recognition, the successor attitude to Kantian respect as an essential constitutive element of the status of normative self-conscious self-hood that is the successor status to Kantian autonomy.

Furthermore, instituting a self in the sense of something with the status of a normative subject requires recognitive attitudes that are *symmetric, reciprocal,* or *mutual*.

Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. **They *recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing* one another**.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Here we see the move from Kantian *immediate* institution of statuses by individual attitudes to the Hegelian recognitive institution of statuses by attitudes that are socially *mediated* by the attitudes of others.

Thus the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses. Each sees the *other* do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same. Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both.[[10]](#footnote-10)

It is this symmetric recognitive constellation of basic normative attitudes and statuses that he refers to in the very next sentence as “the pure Notion of recognition, of the duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness.” It is the basic structure of robust general recognition, in which suitably socially complemented recognitive attitudes institute statuses of recognitive authority, their normative subjects, and the dyadic community that consists of normative subjects who actually reciprocally recognize and are recognized by each other. “The elaboration of the concept of this spiritual unity within its doubling presents us with the movement of *recognition*.”[[11]](#footnote-11)

Recognizing another is taking or treating that other in practice as a normative self: as the subject of normative attitudes and statuses. More specifically, in the model, it is the attitude of attributing the status of authority to institute statuses by one’s attitudes, when those attitudes are suitably complemented. This is a version of the sort of authority that is Kantian autonomy, differing in the understanding of the constellation of attitudes that can institute (actualize otherwise virtual) statuses as socially mediated rather than individually immediate. Adopting recognitive attitudes in this sense is applying to the one recognized an articulated normative concept of a self. It is consciousness of a self *as* a self. The recognizing consciousness also has that concept applied to it; it is a recognizing self *for* a recognizing self. But the self it is a self for, the one that is conscious of it as a self is not itself, but the recognized-recognizing other self. The self-consciousness that is instituted and actualized for the recognizing-and-recognized individuals making up the recognitive dyad is a property they have *as* a recognitive dyad. It is only secondarily and as a result that it is a property of each individual. Hegel refers to the recognitive community of recognizing-and-recognized individual normative subjects as “Spirit” [Geist]:

this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'.[[12]](#footnote-12)

“Independence” is in the model *authority*: the authority of the several recognitive subjects. It is not *immediate* authority (independence), but authority that is socially *mediated* by the attitudes of others, who attribute it in recognizing the independent normative subject *as* authoritative. “Freedom” is Hegel’s term for the symmetric recognitive constellation that integrates immediacy as the actuality of attitudes with their social mediation (through the requirement of suitable complementation of attitudes for their institutional authority).

The diagram above represents only the most general outlines of the complex constellation of basic normative attitudes and statuses that is the model of Hegelian recognition being proposed as a successor to the model of Kantian autonomy. For it characterizes only the structure of robust *general* recognition, the recognitive attitudes that institute the recognitive status of having, which requires being recognized as having, recognitive authority. What is left out of that diagram are the *specific* (nonrecognitive) statuses of responsibility and authority (paradigmatically for claimings or judgings, and intentional doings) that Kant took autonomous normative subjects to have the authority to institute by their attitudes of acknowledgment. Focusing on conditions on possession of *specific* normative statuses, we can start with the one Kantian autonomy emphasizes: responsibility. Hegel does not want to relinquish Kant’s insight that one is responsible only for what one acknowledges responsibility for. He wants to supplement it with the thought that it is nugatory to acknowledge a commitment unless one has licensed someone to *hold* you responsible. (Ultimately, this will be a matter of conditions of the determinate contentfulness of the commitment. Unless *administered*, the commitment is not determinately contentful.) The recognition model requires suitable social complementation of atittudes for statuses that are the objects of those attitudes to be actualized.

It follows that as with the Kantian autonomy structure, attributing a responsibility has to be complemented by the acknowledgment of the subject of the responsibility. One only *is* responsible (a status) for what one *acknowledges* responsibility for (an attitude). The status of responsibility, which is virtual in the sense of just being the object of these paired attitudes of attribution and acknowledgment, only becomes actualized—a status outside the attitudes it is an object of—when the status attributed is also acknowledged. This is just the other side of the coin of the requirement that for acknowledging a commitment or responsibility to succeed in instituting that status (for it to be constitutive of the commitment it acknowledges, for it to be a successful undertaking of that commitment, a status) someone else must both be authorized to *hold* the subject responsible (attribute the commitment, an attitude) and must *actually* do so. Kant does *not* require this social complementation of attitudes, but thinks that autonomous individual subjects just come with the authority to actualize the statuses that are the objects of their attitudes—immediately, in the sense of not depending on any other actual attitudes. And according to the social recognitive model, the same paired conditions requiring social complementation of normative attitudes to institute normative statuses holds for attributions and acknowledgments (claims) of authority. One only *has* authority (including the authority to institute statuses by one’s attitudes) if others *take* one to have that authority by attributing it. A claim of authority only actually institutes the authority claimed if others whom the authoritative subject recognizes as having the authority to do so recognize that authority by attributing it. Absent others treating one *as* authoritative, one’s own claim to authority is incomplete. The authority in question is merely virtual, as the object of the subject’s claiming attitude. It is a presupposition of the actualization of determinate statuses that the one who holds the first subject responsible is authorized to do so, and that that recognizing subject takes it that the first one is authorized to acknowledge the commitment. Acknowledging a status such as responsibility is suitably complemented only if some recognized recognizer also attributes it—holds one responsible. And attributing a status such as responsibility is suitably complemented only if it is also acknowledged by the recognized recognizer to whom it is attributed.

So the full constellation of basic attitudes and statuses that is the Hegelian recognitive model developed on the basis of the Kantian autonomy model (as socially extended to include the duty to respect autonomy) is more complex. It can be diagramed like this:



The attitude that is socially complemented is cross-hatched.

Resultant specific, determinate (nonrecognitive) statuses are in color.

This is the fine structure of the Hegelian reciprocal recognition model of the social institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes.

The top half of this diagram shows the recognitive dyad in which the attitude of acknowledgment of specific normative statuses by normative subject X (shown as shaded) is suitably complemented by Y’s attitudes of attribution so as actually to institute those specific statuses. The bottom half shows the recognitive dyad in which the attitude of attributing of specific normative statuses by normative subject X to normative subject Y (shown as shaded) are suitably complemented by Y’s attitudes of acknowledgment so as actually to institute those specific statuses. Within each dyad, the reciprocal general recognitive attitudes of attributing authority are included at the top. They differ from those in the previous, simplified, diagram of reciprocal general recognition only in that the authority that is reciprocally attributed is now articulated into authority not only to adopt attitudes of attribution of normative statuses (including specific ones), but also attitudes of acknowledgment—in each case, constitutively if suitably complemented. The specific normative statuses instituted by the suitably complemented attitudes are on the lower left of the top dyad and on the lower right of the bottom one. What one sees there is essentially the diagram of the basic Kantian normative status of autonomy. Each subject has the authority to institute normative statuses (including specific ones) by acknowledging them. The big differences are:

* *All* the normative statuses are instituted by appropriate constellations of normative attitudes—constellations in which they are suitably socially complemented.
* The attribution by others of the authority to adopt constitutive (status-instituting) attitudes, which corresponds to Kantian respect, is an essential element, a *necessary* condition, of the institution of that authority.
* The whole structure of statuses and attitudes, including other-regarding ones, in which the substructure taking the place of the Kantian autonomy structure of statuses and attitudes is embedded, is being taken to be the context *sufficient* for the institution of statuses by attitudes.

The core idea of the recognitive model concerns what is required for statuses of responsibility and authority that are virtual in the sense of being the objects of attitudes of attribution and acknowledgment to be actualized. It is the idea that it is necessary and sufficient for the attitudes in question to be part of an appropriate constellation of other attitudes. A constellation of attitudes appropriate for realizing their objects is one in which the attitudes of attributing or acknowledging responsibility and authority are suitably complemented by other attitudes. When the statuses that are attributed to another subject are also acknowledged by that subject, and when the statuses that are acknowledged by one subject are attributed to that subject, and when the normative subjects of these symmetric attitudes generally recognize each other, then genuine normative statuses are instituted. To recognize someone in the general sense is to attribute the *authority* to adopt attitudes that will, if suitably complemented, institute statuses, that is *actualize* the statuses that are the objects of those attitudes.

1. The Recognitive Institution of Statuses, Subjects, and Communities

According to the recognitive model, the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes, the actualization of the objects of those attitudes, requires *complementary* attitudes: attributions of statuses and acknowledgements of those statuses must symmetrically balance each other. Corresponding to this symmetry of attitudes is a symmetry of recognitive statuses. According to the model, the *authority* to recognize (which is, *inter alia*, attributed by the attitude of recognition) and the *responsibility* to recognize are two sides of one coin. Attributing recognitive authority implies acknowledging recognitive responsibility. To say this is to say more than just that if X has authority over Y then Y is responsible to X. That is indeed a fundamental principle relating these normative statuses. But one must look more closely at the concept of general recognition to discern the symmetry of general recognitive attitudes and statuses.

So far I have talked about suitable complementation of attitudes, but not about the actualization or institution of statuses that, according to the model, it brings about. What is the result of exercising the authority attributed to a subject when one recognizes that subject? What does it mean to say that the statuses that are the objects of attitudes that are suitably complemented by the attitudes of others who recognize and are recognized by the subject of those attitudes become *actual*? In the first instance, it means that anyone who recognizes a subject attributes to it the statuses that are the objects of its suitably complemented attitudes. Anyone who recognizes that subject takes the subject really to have the responsibilities and authority that it acknowledges (when the acknowledgment is suitably complemented by attributions), and joins the recognized subject in attributing the specific responsibilities and authority to the subject to whom the recognized subject attributes them (when the recognized subject’s attributions are suitably complemented by acknowledgments on the part of their target). If X recognizes Y, X takes Y to have the authority to institute determinate authority and responsibility by acknowledging or attributing those statuses, so long as Y’s attitudes are suitably complemented by those of another subject (including X) whom Y recognizes in turn. X attributes the statuses that are the objects of Y’s suitably complemented attitudes to Y, or to whomever Y attributes them to. That is part of X’s taking the statuses Y acknowledges or attributes to be actual, when Y’s attitudes are suitably complemented.

But there is more to X taking the statuses that are the objects of Y’s suitably complemented attitudes to be actual than just X attributing those statuses. X’s taking the statuses actually to have been instituted by Y’s suitably complemented attitudes also includes attributing the *responsibility* to attribute those statuses to *everyone* X recognizes, as well as acknowledging it itself. That is, part of general recognition, of attributing to one subject Y the authority to institute (actualize) normative statuses by adopting suitably complemented normative attitudes is attributing to everyone who has the authority to institute such statuses the responsibility to attribute the statuses so instituted. What is at issue is a universal quantification in the indirect object place of an attribution of responsibility. In recognizing anyone, one is attributing not only authority, but responsibility. The authority to institute statuses by one’s suitably complemented attitudes comes with a responsibility to attribute statuses so instituted by those one recognizes. For attributing those statuses just is taking them to be actual. So the cash value of recognizing someone as having the authority to institute statuses by their attitudes (when the attitudes are suitably complemented) is that one takes everyone, not just oneself, to be obliged practically to treat those instituted statuses as actual—that is, to be responsible for attributing them. Attributing and acknowledging a *responsibility* of that distinctive kind—universally quantified in the indirect object position—is a necessary part of the attribution of *authority* that is recognition. For it is what taking the authority being attributed to be authority to *actualize* the objects of the recognized subject’s attitudes, to be the authority to *institute* statuses by adopting attitudes (when those attitudes are suitably complemented), consists in.

The fact that for the authority attributed by attitudes of general recognition to be the authority to institute statuses by one’s attitudes it must be accompanied by the attribution to everyone one recognizes of responsibility to take or treat those statuses in practice *as* actual has a number of consequences. One is that in recognizing any normative subject one thereby obliges oneself to recognize anyone that subject recognizes. If X recognizes Y then X takes it that Y has the authority to institute statuses by Y’s attitudes, if they are suitably complemented by the attitudes of someone Z whom Y recognizes and who recognizes Y. (X can play this role, but it need not be X who does.) In that case X takes it that everyone, including X has the responsibility to attribute the statuses that are instituted by the suitably complemented attitudes of the recognitive dyad of Y and Z. But that means X is obliged to take Z as having the authority to adopt attitudes that can suitably complement those of Y. Attributing the authority to adopt attitudes that can suitably complement and be suitably complemented just is general recognition. So in recognizing Y, X makes itself responsible for recognizing whoever Y recognizes. Granted, Z might not actually recognize Y, even though Y recognizes Z. Or, though Z does generally recognize Y, Z might not actually adopt specific attitudes that suitably complement Y’s specific attitudes (acknowledging what Y attributes or attributing what Y acknowledges). Nonetheless, X is committed to its being the case that *if* Z did those things, genuine normative statuses would be instituted thereby. And that is to say that in recognizing Y, X becomes responsible for attributing to any Z whom Y recognizes the *authority* to do those things: to generally recognize Y and to adopt attitudes that suitably complement Y’s attitudes, so as to actualize the statuses that are the objects of those attitudes. And to attribute that authority to Z just is to generally recognize Z.

In this sense, then, general recognition is *transitive*. It need not be the case that if X actually recognizes Y and Y actually recognizes Z that X *actually* recognizes Z. X might not in fact adopt the relevant attitude, might not actually attribute to Z the authority to adopt attitudes that can institute statuses when suitably complemented and that can suitably complement the attitudes of others. But if X actually recognizes Y and Y actually recognizes Z, it is the case that in virtue of his recognition of Y, X is and acknowledges being *responsible* for, *committed* to recognizing Z.

To be a self in the full normative sense is to have not only actual normative attitudes, but also actual normative statuses: not only to *take* oneself or others to have authority or be responsible, but actually to *have* authority or *be* responsible. To achieve such a status, a normative subject must participate in a general recognitive dyad: must actually be recognized by someone that subject actually recognizes. For only suitably socially complemented attitudes institute actual statuses. It follows that normative statuses, normative subjects of such statuses, and recognitive communities of normative subjects are all synthesized simultaneously by recognitive processes that have an appropriate structure: the structure of reciprocal recognition, Hegel’s “gegenseitig Anerkennung.” The basic normative statuses in this model are responsibility and authority, corresponding to Hegel’s “Abhängigkeit” and “Unabhängigkeit” when those terms are applied on the side of subjects. Being a self in the sense of being a subject of such basic normative statuses is another kind of normative status, as is being a *member* of a *community* of selves or normative subjects, synthesized by normative attitudes of reciprocal recognition between such subjects. The model explains how it is that these two in some sense derivative normative statuses, being a normative self or subject and being a member of a normative community, are actually and necessarily the *same* normative status, looked at in two different ways. It is the normative, social “substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses… 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'.”[[13]](#footnote-13)

The minimal community that is *self-instituting* in the dual sense of instituting both selves and a community of selves (along with normative statuses of responsibility and authority) is a recognitive dyad: two individuals who each recognize and are recognized by the other, who both attribute and acknowledge normative statuses. Much larger such communities are possible, in which each member stands in reciprocal recognitive relations to each other member: *each* recognizing and being recognized by *all* the others *as* at once normative subject and a member of the recognitive community. Hegel uses “self-consciousness” to describe the dual status each member of such a recognitive community has as both a subject of genuine normative statuses and a member of a recognitive community. Self-consciousness in the sense of this normative status is not the immediate achievement of an individual, as it is for Kant. It is an essentially *social* status, a kind of self-relation that is mediated by recognitive relations to others. It is a paradigm case of a kind identity forged from differences, as a status that essentially includes relations to others, who also have that status in virtue of their recognitive relations. Each exercises independent *authority* in adopting attitudes of recognition towards others, and each is in turn *responsible* to those others in being dependent upon them for their recognition in turn (on pain of no actual normative statuses being instituted, including those of being a self-conscious normative subject and community member). This constitutive constellation of reciprocal authority and responsibility, normative independence and dependence, Hegel calls “freedom.” As Hegel puts it in the passage I have already cited several times, which closes his introduction to his *Self-Consciousness* chapter:

A self-consciousness exists *for a self-consciousness.* Only so is it in fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become explicit for it…A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much 'I' as 'object'. With this, we already have before us the Notion of *Spirit.* What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is—this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'.[[14]](#footnote-14)

What we, the readers of the *Phenomenology*, are to learn is the social metaphysics of genuine normativity—authority, responsibility, self-conscious self-hood, and the normative social substance that is Geist—as presented in the model of the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes of reciprocal recognition. The form that the argument for this model takes is a rehearsal of the defects of social structures of normative attitudes that do not have the symmetric social structure required by the model for the institution of genuine normative statuses. That is the topic of the next lecture [chapter], which reads the various allegories recounted in the *Self-Consciousness* chapter, beginning with those collected under the rubric of the Master and the Servant (“Herr und Knecht”), in terms of the reciprocal recognition model presented here.

1. The Status-Dependence of Attitudes

At the center of this lecture has been an account of Hegel’s successor-conception to Kant’s autonomy version of the *attitude-dependence* of some crucial normative statuses, specifically determinately contentful responsibilities, both doxastic and practical (for Kant endorsements in the form of judgments and practical maxims.

Kant combines his development of the characteristic modern idea of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses with an acknowledgment of the traditional idea of the status-dependence of normative attitudes. For Kant, the authority that is autonomy, and the responsibility that is the duty to respect (the precursor of recognition) are statuses that are *not* instituted by attitudes. They are postulated as actual authority and responsibility, that are not promoted from the virtual status of being objects of attitudes that institute them. Hegel’s critique of modernity takes the form of a diagnosis of it as opposing a one-sided hypersubjectivity to the one-sided hyper-objectivity of traditional conceptions of normativity. That normative statuses are attitude-dependent is a genuine insight. But it will be understood only one-sidedly if it is not balanced by an appreciation of what was right about the traditional appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes: the responsibility attitudes owe to statuses, the dimension of authority that statuses exert over attitudes. Kant has one way of combining these insights. Hegel proposes another.

The bulk of the discussion in this lecture [chapter] has been on the side of *pragmatics*: the study of the normative attitudes and statuses that are the bearers of determinate content. To understand the dimension of status-dependence of attitudes, we must look also to the side of *semantics*. For the distinction between *phenomena* and *noumena*, between appearance and reality, between what things are *for consciousness* and what they are *in themselves*, shows up *both* in the form of the pragmatic distinction between attitudes and statuses *and* in the form of the distinction between senses and referents, as that semantic distinction is rendered in Hegel’s terms. In pragmatic terms, it takes the form of the distinction between what consciousness is *for* (a) *consciousness* (itself or another) and what (a) consciousness is *in itself*. This is the distinction between what a normative subject is *really* committed or entitled to, its actual responsibilities and authority, and what responsibilities or authority other subjects attribute to it, or it acknowledges itself. That is just the distinction between statuses and attitudes. Semantically, though, appearances, what things are for consciousness, are the Hegelian analog of Fregean senses. What those senses refer to or represent, how things are in themselves, is the reality that is the Hegelian analog of Fregean referents. Hegel accepts Kant’s insight that what a representing (here, a sense, an appearance, what things are *for* consciousness) represents is what exercises a distinctive kind of *authority* over the correctness of the representing. That is what the representing is *responsible* to for its correctness, what provides the normative standard for assessments of its correctness. This is the semantic correlate of the status-dependence of normative attitudes: the sense in which what consciousness is *for* consciousness, a subject’s normative attitudes, is *responsible to* (dependent upon) what consciousness is *in* itself (what it is *really* committed to or authoritative about), which accordingly exercises *authority over* those attitudes.

The relation between phenomena as representings (Hegelian senses) and noumena as representeds (Hegelian referents) is established by the process of *recollection* (Erinnerung). That is a retrospective rational reconstruction of an expressively progressive process of experience as explicitation: the gradual emergence *for* consciousness of how things are *in* themselves. There is a deep connection between this account of the process by which content is *determined*—viewed prospectively, becoming more determinate, viewed retrospectively, explicitly revealing new aspects of the always-already determinate content that has been implicit—and the relations between normative attitudes and normative statuses according to the recognitive model of the institution of statuses by attitudes. To begin with, the context of those content-determining processes on the side of semantics is provided by the recognitive processes that institute normative statuses on the side of pragmatics. As we saw in the discussion of the *Consciousness* chapters, and will consider further in the discussion of *Reason*, content-determination is the incorporation of immediacy in the mediated form of conceptual content. Specifically, that immediacy takes the form of normative *attitudes* that subjects *actually* adopt in the course of experience, in response to collisions among attitudes they find themselves with, both through perception and through inference. Those collisions of attitudes are the experience of error. Acknowledging some commitments normatively requires sacrificing others incompatible with them. That phase of the experience of error in turn requires retrospective revisions of one’s understanding of the conceptual *contents* of one’s commitments: of what is *really* incompatible with what and what *really* follows from what. This final retrospective, rationally reconstructive phase of each cycle of the experience of error enforces *to* consciousness the distinction between noumena and phenomena, between how things really are and how things merely seem or appear. The form that distinction takes on the side of the subject *is* the distinction between normative *statuses*, what one has *really* committed oneself to in claiming, for instance, that the coin is copper, and normative *attitudes*, what one *takes* oneself to be committed to in making such a claim. This pragmatic distinction reflects the distinction between the conceptual contents that are Hegelian referents and those that are Hegelian senses: the appearances of those referents, what they are *for* consciousness.

Thought of from the point of view of the subject, the process of content-determination, by which noumena (referents, representeds) become something *to* consciousness distinct from the phenomena (senses, representings) that the experience of error unmasks as what things are *for* consciousness, is the emergence of the distinction between what *is* right (with respect to the relations of material incompatibility-and-consequence that articulate conceptual contents) and what *seems* right to the subject whose contentful commitments are at issue. This is just the distinction between normative *statuses* and normative *attitudes*. As Wittgenstein puts the point: “If whatever seems right to me is right, then there is no question of right or wrong.”[[15]](#footnote-15) Pragmatically, the question of how to understand noumena in terms of phenomena, which we have been addressing semantically, shows up precisely as the question of how it is that *attitudes* (how things seem to the subject) can institute genuine *statuses*, which are binding on and beyond the attitudes of the subject. How can mere attitudes be transcended? (Compare: How can referents become something *to* consciousness beyond mere senses, what things are *for* consciousness?) Here we have seen that the key insight motivating the recognitive model is that we can make sense of the distinction between status and attitude only if in *acknowledging* a *responsibility* (committing oneself) one is at the same time *authorizing* *others* to *hold* one responsible, by *attributing* that responsibility (commitment). They then can be understood as *administering* a *content* one has committed oneself to—a content that is *not* determined just by the attitudes of the acknowledger. To see *acknowledging* a *responsibility* and *attributing authority* (to hold one responsible) as two sides of one coin *both* articulates the distinction between mere attitudes and genuine statuses, *and* brings into play the notion of *determinate content* as what one makes oneself responsible *for*. This is what the requirement that attitudes be *suitably complemented* in order to institute genuine statuses does. It makes available determinate contents, and thereby articulates the dimension along which attitudes are dependent upon statuses, in the sense of being responsible to them for assessments of their correctness: senses as answering for their correctness to referents. The status-dependence of attitudes shows up in the recognitive model as a sense in which *pragmatics* (the theory of normative *force*) is constrained by *semantics* (the theory of conceptual *content*).

Statuses are normative *noumena* (what consciousness is *in* itself), and attitudes are normative *phenomena* (what consciousness is *for* itself or for others). The story about noumena/phenomena in terms of recollection is accordingly the form of the story about the status-dependence of attitudes. Kant, having top-level *general* statuses, had this aspect of status-dependence of attitudes as well as attitude-dependence of statuses, since both autonomy and the duty of respect (the precursor of recognition) are statuses, but what autonomy is the authority to *do* is to institute statuses by attitudes, which is a form of the attitude-dependence of the resulting *specific* statuses. So Kant divided the labor: status-dependence of *general* attitudes (including the precursor of recognition—autonomy being the precursor of “suitably complementation”, as a notion of *constitutiveness* of attitudes) and attitude-dependence of *specific* statuses.

The statuses and their contents are determined by what is represented. The attitudes are can be thought of as senses, which inherit this crucial dimension of content from their referents. The *content* determines what one is *really* responsible *for*: the status to which the attitudes answer for their correctness, even though they instituted the status. That responsibility is administered by those one has made oneself responsible *to* in endorsing or acknowledging a responsibility, those to whom one has thereby ceded the *authority* to determine what one is *really* responsible for. If there is no responsibility *to* others, then in exercising one’s authority to commit oneself, one has not succeeded in making oneself responsible *for* any determinate content. *That* is the cost of not having responsibility to others, authority of others, correlative with one’s own authority (to undertake responsibility).

In claiming that the coin is copper, the commitment I undertake, the responsibility I acknowledge, is not determined just by my attitudes. I have made myself responsible to the actual content of the concept copper I have applied. I have authorized others to hold me responsible, not just according to my conception of copper (what I take to follow from or be incompatible with such a commitment, a matter of my attitudes), but according to the real content of the counter I have played in the public language-game. That is what determines what I have really committed myself to, the status I have actually acquired by my performance. The essentially *social* relations between normative attitudes and normative statuses—*both* the institution of statuses by attitudes *and* the dependence of attitudes on statuses (their responsibility to statuses for their correctness)—on the pragmatic side of force, and the essentially *historical* relations between what the contents are for consciousness (phenomena, senses, representing) and what they are in themselves (noumena, referents, represented) on the semantic side of conceptual content are two sides of one coin, recognitive and experiential aspects of one sort of developmental process. A rough diagram of the story so far is this:



The retrospective, rational-reconstructive *historical* phase of the process of experience, Hegel’s “Erinnerung”, explains how, on the semantic side, objective conceptual contents (referents, noumena) articulated as laws, facts, and objects with properties both are to be understood in terms of and serve as standards for assessments of the correctness of the process of manipulating subjective conceptual contents (senses) by applying rules, propositions, and singular terms and predicates in adopting doxastic (and, as we’ll see further along, practical) attitudes. The *social* character of the recognitive process that institutes both normative subjects and their communities explains, on the pragmatic side, both how normative statuses (noumena, what self-conscious subjects are in themselves) are instituted by (and in that strong sense dependent upon) normative attitudes (phenomena, what self-conscious subjects are for themselves) and how those statuses have authority over those attitudes in serving as standards for assessment of their correctness. This is the dimension of status-dependence of normative attitudes, the responsibility of those attitudes to (Hegel’s “dependence on”) statuses that balances the attitude-dependence of normative statuses.

1. Conclusion

The recognitive model is Hegel’s way of synthesizing two crucial insights. First is what he sees as the founding insight of modernity, the idea that normative statuses are attitude-dependent, as boiled down and purified in the Kant-Rousseau idea of autonomy into the idea that at least some normative statuses are *instituted by* normative attitudes. The second is what was right about the traditional idea (one-sidedly overemphasized by premodern thought) of the status-dependence of normative attitudes: the idea that our attributions and acknowledgments (or claimings) of responsibility and authority answer for their correctness to facts about what people really are committed and entitled to. The complex social-historical recognitive model of normativity is Hegel’s way of performing the Eiertanz required to make simultaneous sense both of the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes and of the role of normative statuses as standards for assessments of the correctness of normative attitudes. At its base is the idea that to undertake a responsibility must always also be to acknowledge the authority of others to hold one responsible—implicitly to attribute that authority. And explicitly to attribute determinately contentful authority to someone is also always to attribute implicit responsibilities defined by that content, administered on its behalf by others to whom one has made oneself responsible by the original assertion of the authority to make oneself responsible. In the case of the attribution of authority that is general recognition, this includes acknowledging one’s own responsibility to respect exercises of that authority. In Hegel’s terms, there is no independence without a correlative dependence, and *vice versa*. And consciousness is essentially self-consciousness, in the sense that one cannot make sense of what consciousness is in itself apart from concern with what it is for itself. Further, it is of the essence of the recognitive model of self-conscious normative subjects that “what consciousness is for itself” is always a matter of the constellation of attitudes comprising what *a* self-consciousness, an individual normative subject, is both *for itself* and *for others* in the recognitive community that is necessarily simultaneously synthesized by reciprocal recognitive attitudes along with individual self-consciousnesses.

1. Compare “the distinction that action essentially involves” at PG §400, discussed in Chapter 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [ref.] to Perry and Lewis, and to my discussion of this in *MIE* Ch. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. More on this in Chapters 11 and 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. [ref.] [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. This is the pure social-status “Queens Shilling” sense of “responsible”: doing something that (whether one knows it or not) has the social significance of entitling others to attribute a responsibility. In *MIE* I try to make go as far as it can all on its own. Such an enterprise can seem perverse, but it is adopted with with Popperian methodological malice aforethought. The idea is to explore the strongest, most easily falsifiable hypothesis, to see what explanatory work it can do, how far it will take one, before its explanatory resources are exhausted. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. *PhG* [M185]. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. *PhG* [P178]. [The “P” indicates this is Pinkard’s translation, rather than Miller’s.] [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *PhG* [M177]. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *PhG* [M184]. Emphasis added. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. *PhG* [M182]. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *PhG* [P178]. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *PhG* [M177]. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *PhG* [M177]. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. *PhG* [M177]. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. [ref.] [from *AII* 2.] [↑](#footnote-ref-15)